Rational basis review, in U.S. constitutional law, refers to a level of scrutiny applied by courts when deciding cases presenting constitutional due process or equal protection issues related to the Fifth Amendment or Fourteenth Amendment. Rational basis is the lowest level of scrutiny that a court applies when engaging in judicial review. The higher levels of scrutiny include intermediate scrutiny and strict scrutiny. Rational basis is the default level of review; however, rational basis review does not usually apply in situations where a suspect or quasi-suspect classification is involved, or a fundamental right is implicated.
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The rational basis review tests whether a governmental action is a reasonable means to an end that may be legitimately pursued by the government. This test requires that the governmental action be “rationally related” to a “legitimate” government interest.[1] [2] Under this standard of review, the “legitimate interest” does not have to be the government’s actual interest. Rather, if the court can merely hypothesize a “legitimate” interest served by the challenged action, it will withstand the rational basis review.[3]
Rational basis review originated with the means-ends test used by the U.S. Supreme Court in McCulloch v. Maryland in 1819. However, the actual introduction of modern rational basis review came in 1938 in United States v. Carolene Products Co., in which rational basis review became separate and distinct from strict scrutiny.
In modern constitutional law, the rational basis test is applied to constitutional challenges of both federal law and state law (via the Fourteenth Amendment). This test also applies to both legislative and executive action whether those actions be of a substantive or procedural nature.
Congress is required to have a rational basis for legislation that, without it, might violate a right of a person under the U.S. Constitution's Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause but is not required to validate scientific conclusions to the same degree that may be required in academic science; rather, the legislative reasoning must not be arbitrary.[4]